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Through the public forum of the 19S7 White Paper, the government of Canada an-
nounced its intentions to make major changes to Canada's military and to her defense
posture. Among other things, the White Paper publicized the planned acquisition often
to twelve nuclear powered submarines. The government hopes that these submarines
will help assert Canada's claim of sovereignty in the waters of the Canadian Archipelago
including the Northwest Passage. The United States considers the Northwest Passage
to be a strait used for international navigation and subject to the right of transit passage.
The SSNs will also have a clearly martial role in protecting Canada's economic interests,
and her national security responsibilities in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Arctic
Oceans. This thesis examines these reasons behind Canada's decision to acquire an SSN
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I. CANADA INTENDS TO ACQUIRE SSNS--WHY?
In June 19S7, the Canadian government published a White Paper on national
defense. While briefly addressing the current status of the Canadian Forces, the 1987
White Paper was a document which described the future of the armed forces as proposed
be the Mulroney government. These proposals include an increase in defense spending,
abandonment of the commitment to reinforce Norway, and the acquisition of
nuclear-powered submarines (SSN). While the first intention was well received by
Canada's allies, the latter two were not. Of these, it is the proposed addition of
nuclear-powered submarines to the Canadian navy which has aroused the greatest
interest in the United States and has the potential to have the greatest impact on the
relationship between the US and Canada.
This is not the first time Canada has considered acquiring nuclear-powered
submarines. In the late 1950s, Canada decided against such submarines and instead
purchased three Oberon class diesel submarines from Great Britain. Last year the
decision went the other other way and the choice was for nuclear-powered submarines
over conventional ones. In part, this was due to the fact that nuclear power technology
has matured and is today more affordable than it was thirty years ago. However, the
over-riding consideration which led to this decision was the fact that given the national
security and defense needs of Canada in all three oceans-the Atlantic, the Pacific, and
the Arctic—which border her shores, the nuclear powered submarine is far superior to
any other platform in its ability to meet those security and defense requirements.
Canada's economic ties to the Asia-Pacific region have grown tremendously over the
past two decades. Japan is now Canada's second leading trading partner surpassed only
by the United States. The 1987 White Paper identifies a significant change in policy by
placing increasing importance on this region in recognition of its economic and security
value. At the same time, Soviet activity in the area has also increased. The threat of
sea launched cruise missiles (SLCM) from the Pacific has placed new emphasis on
anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Protection of the sea lines of communication (SLOC)
in the Pacific is of vital interest to Canada and the United States.
Canada continues to consider her security to be intimately bound to the security of
western Europe and to NATO. For this reason, her Atlantic fleet will continue to get
first priority. As in the past. Canada's NATO maritime role is escort duty for the
convoys carrying supplies necessary for NATO's survival in times of conflict. Protection
of the Atlantic SLOCs as well as the Pacific SLOCs requires effective ASW capabilities
to meet the threat of Soviet submarines. This responsibility has lead to the decision to
acquire SSNs. The best ASW weapon is considered to be another submarine and the
SSNs were judged to be superior to conventional submarines in meeting Canada's
defense needs.
In the Arctic Ocean as elsewhere, the principal threat to Canada and North America
is the Soviet Union and the Soviet navy's submarines. This is recognized by both
Canada and the United States and is the reason why US SSNs patrol under the ice at
the North Pole. The proposed Candadian SSNs would share in this responsibility but
there's a twist. While Canada's national security and defense needs alone are sufficient
to drive the decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, it is Canada's claim that
the Arctic's Northwest Passage are internal or territorial Canadian waters and the
potential use of the proposed SSNs to "enforce" that claim which has received the most
attention by the Canadian press, officials in the Canadian government, and the US
Department of Defense. It is difficult for many in the US to realize how emotional this
issue is for the Canadian public. The claim to sovereignty in the Northwest Passage is
not only a legal issue but is bound up in national pride and national identity. In an
effort to ensure Canadian sovereignty, in 1985, the House of Commons made a
declaration of straight baselines encompassing the Canadian (Arctic) Archipelago. This
action was not supported by international law. The United States does not recognize
this declaration and continues to consider that portion of the Northwest Passage which
passes through the Canadian Archipelago as international waters or high seas. The
United States stands firmly committed to the principle of freedom of the seas. It is of
the utmost importance that US warships (including submarines) continue to have
unimpeded access to the world's major bodies of water including--or perhaps
especially--the Arctic Ocean. Neither side in this matter is likely to substantially change
its position. And yet, if both possess the ability to transit this often ice-covered
waterway in submerged nuclear-powered submarines, then it is absolutely essential that
these two close neighbors and allies be able to work together. Resolving the legal
question one way or the other is not nearly as important as being able to effectively work
with each other to ensure the safety and security of North America.
Chapter II of this thesis looks at the 1987 White Paper and its proposed changes to
the Canadian military's employment, particularly the decision to abandon the Canadian
commitment to reinforce Norway and the decision to acquire SSXs. Chapter III
addresses the issue of sovereignty in the Canadian Archipelago. This issue is examined
under the parameters of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, the 19S2 Law of the Sea Convention, and customary international law. Chapter
IV examines the maritime requirements of Canada in order to meet her national security
and defense needs in the Atlantic in support of NATO, the Pacific, and the Arctic
Oceans. The last chapter, Chapter V, provides some recommendations and looks at the
type of working relationship between the United States and Canada which will best fulfill
the mutual defense soals.
II. MATCHING CANADIAN COMMITMENTS AND
CAPABILITIES--THE 1987 WHITE PAPER
For the first time since 1971 Canada has published a White Paper which addresses
Canada's security policy and the contribution of the Canadian Forces to that policy.
Rather than a document of facts it is a statement of intentions. For interested
non-Canadians there are three important points or commitments:
1. Modernization of Canadian Forces and a strong promise of 2% real growth in
defense spending per year.
2. Acquisition of ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines and a three-ocean
strategy.
3. Abandonment of the commitment to reinforce northern Norway.
A. CHANGES IN NATO COMMITMENTS
While justifiably proud of the professionalism and skill of the members of the
Canadian Forces (CF). the White Paper also acknowledges the effect years of neglect
has had on those armed forces. Of the NATO allies, Canada ranks third from the
bottom ahead only of Denmark and Luxemburg in terms of defence spending as a
percentage of GDP. It is somewhat embarrassing as Canada ranks as the third richest
per capita. While the proposed increase in defense spending of 2% real growth a year
is below the 3% goal NATO supports, it would nonetheless be a significant and very
welcome improvement. If maintained for the full fifteen years addressed by the White
Paper, it could greatly affect Canada's voice internationally and her standing within the
alliance [Ref. 1: p. 46].
The government of Canada believes the only way her security needs can be met is
within the collective security framework of NATO. The White Paper identifies central
Europe as the center of gravity in the balance of power, the geographical focus of the
conflict between East and West. Canada's continued support ofNATO and the linkage
of Canadian security with that of NATO are reiterated throughout the White Paper in
the strongest possible terms. However, Canada also cuts a major commitment--the
Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade and two fighter squadrons assigned to
the defense of Norway. This decision to abandon a twenty year commitment to
reinforce Norway in the event of Soviet aggression is based on the need to eliminate the
gap between commitment and capability. Canada's lack of theater-level logistics, lack
of medical support, the time necessary to deploy, and the inability of the CAST brigade
to make an opposed landing combined with the difficulties of reinforcement and resupply
brought her to this hard decision. Both the CAST brigade and the the fighter squadrons
will be shifted to the central front, to southern Germany. Canada has softened the blow
to Norway by agreeing to retain her commitment until an acceptable replacement is
identified. Also, much of the pre-positioned equipment will remain in Norway for use
by the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force A.MF(L), the ACE brigade, a small
mobile, multinational NATO task force to which Canada has a battalion commitment
[Ref. 2: p. 63]. At present no ally has volunteered a brigade for Norway. Instead, the
Norwegian government is apparently willing to take on battalions from several countries
to reinforce Norwegian brigades in a crisis. These reinforcements will include a battalion
of Bundeswehr troops; it will be the first time Norway has accepted West German
combat troops on its soil since World War II. Interestingly. Norway's decision to accept
a German combat force may create a problem for Finland. Finland signed a defense
pact with the Soviet Union in 1948 which would allow the Soviets to march into Finland
to challenge any perceived threat across Finnish territory from Germany and her allies.
Moscow has already criticized NATO plans to send West German troops to Norway
[Ref. 3: p. 30].
Canada's commitment to Norway was not only military but a political as well.
While Canada cannot be accused of completely abandoning her political commitment
to Norway, the political signal this decision to abandon Norway sends to the Soviet
Union that is extremely troubling. Norway shares a 122 mile contiguous border with the
Soviet Union. Soviet concentration of strategic (nuclear) and conventional forces on the
Kola Peninsula is increasing. Over 60% of the Soviet strategic submarine force is
stationed in this area which is due east of the Soviet-Norwegian border. Some experts
claim the Kola Peninsula contains the largest concentration of modern military force
anywhere in the world. It also provides important components of the Soviets' early
warning and forward air defense systems. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Soviets
have large troop emplacements in the area. As a result of Norway's precarious position
on NATO's northern flank, a favorite initiation scenario for wargamers has long been a
Soviet invasion of Norway across and down the Kola Peninsula. It should be obvious
that a credible Norwegian defense, effective not only in wartime but also as a deterrent
in times of peace, is vitally important not only to Norway but to all of NATO.
B. A MODERN NAVY
Nowhere is the need for modernization of the CF more apparent than the navy.
At present the navy relies exclusively on vessels in commission or under construction in
1971. The newest ship is already fourteen years old. The oldest, at thirty-one years, is
older than most of those who sail her. In 1963 there were forty-five major warships and
ten minesweepers. Today there are only twenty-six warships including three diesel
submarines and no minesweepers [Ref. 2: p. 44]. In 1983, a parliamentary committee
reported that Canada's navy, the world's third largest after World War II, no longer
could defend Canada's coastline [Ref. 4: p. 9]. Today Canada has embarked on a
vigorous program of modernizing her navy.
The present day Canadian navy consists of about 10,000 "regular" personnel with
an additional 3,300 in the primary reserve. These men and women operate and support
a fleet consisting of four destroyer squadrons, nine maritime air squadrons, and a single
submarine squadron. These units operate in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) task groups
which conduct surveillance, protect vital shipping and support joint security operation
with Canada's allies. Canada has naval bases on both coasts with the submarine
squadron homeported on the east coast.
According to the 1987 White Paper. Canada intends to protect her economic and
security interests in the three oceans contiguous to her shores—the Pacific, the Atlantic,
and the Arctic Oceans. The Asia-Pacific region is becoming increasingly important to
Canada. Trade with that area has shown an impressive increase and, in 1985, the port
of Vancouver alone handled more cargo than Canada's entire east coast. In the
Atlantic. Canada's traditional NATO responsibility is and continues to be the defense
of convoys vital to the resupply ofNATO and western Europe. In both the Atlantic and
the Pacific, Canada must be able to defend the sea lines of communication (SLOC)
between herself, her trading partners, and her allies. The Arctic Ocean presents a special
challenge because much of it is ice covered. Only one platform can operate under the
ice--a nuclear powered submarine. In all three of these oceans, it is Soviet submarines
which offer the greatest threat. It is in Canada's own best interest and the best interest
of her allies that Canada be able to conduct her ASW role in the most effective way
possible. An excellent ASW platform in open ocean and the only one which can operate
under the ice is the nuclear powered submarine. This is the conclusion reached by the
Canadian government as Canada's tiny fleet of diesel submarines rapidly reaches the end
of its service life.
Under the Tribal Class Update and Modernization Project (TRUMP) four
destroyers are currently undergoing extensive modernization. They are intended to
provide area air defense and command and control for anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
task groups. At present six patrol frigates are under construction and an additional six
are planned. These warships also have an ASW role and will carry modern helicopters
to increase the distance and speed at which they can prosecute submarines. The process
to select a new helicopter to replace the aging Sea King helicopters is already underway.
Through these programs the Canadian Navy will greatly enhance its airborne and
surface capabilities. Table 1 shows the current status of Canadian maritime forces.







































[Ref. 2: p. 30]
C. THE DECISION TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES
A balanced, more effective fleet is the combination of not only airborne and surface
assets but also subsurface ones all working together to produce a synergistic effect. The
subsurface asset selected by the Canadians is the nuclear-powered attack submarine
(SS\). The final result will give them a ratio of surface combatants to sub-surface units
(excluding ballistic missile submarines) similar to that of Britain which is 1.7 to 1
[Ref. 5: p. 5]. This choice has been much criticized within Canada and abroad.
During the 1984 election campaign, now Prime Minister Mulroney promised to
vigorously reverse a twenty year decline in Canada's military spending. Instead of a 6%
real increase as promised, if the proposals of the White Paper are fully implemented,
there will be at most an increase of 3-4% over the next fifteen to twenty years. There
is opposition to the proposals made in the White Paper and the proposed SSN fleet in
particular for a variety of reasons.
Some believe the Canadian public will not support even a modest increase in defense
expenditures if it impacts on monies spent on social programs. According to one
professor of political science at Carleton University in Ottawa and an activist in the
Liberal Party
,
the money intended for the SSNs would be far better spent on social
programs specifically child care programs and on reducing Canada's budget deficit
[Ref. 6]. The two oppostion parties, the Liberal and New Democratic Party (NDP),
are criticizing the proposed SSNs as becoming part of a new aggressive American policy
of seeking to intercept Soviet submarines in their home waters [Ref. 7: p. B5]. A
variation on this theme is the claim that SSNs are strictly an offensive weapon and are
not in keeping with the generally defensive posture of Canada's military.
It has also been argued that the SSNs are simply too expensive and could end up
costing S10 billion (the government has estimated the cost at S8 billion) which is more
than one year's total military budget in Canada [Ref. 8: p. 21]. It is felt that passive
sonar systems combined with surface ships, diesel submarines, and aircraft could fulfill
the same role at less expense.
For other Canadians the word "nuclear" conjures up images of evil and an almost
automatic opposition to the SSNs. The notion that nuclear submarines are those having
nuclear weapons is far from the truth. Canada's nuclear powered submarines will carry
the same non-nuclear weapons originally planned for the conventionally powered
submarines. The SSNs are not nuclear armed, they are nuclear propelled.
Other options were thoroughly examined but fell short in their ability to do the job
required. The job in peacetime is ocean surveillance. During time of war, the primary
mission would be intercepting and prosecuting hostile submarines. For these roles diesel
submarines, the use of mines, as well as SSNs were carefully considered.
As early as 1958 Canada had considered acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.
At that time conventional boats were a bargain and won approval. Three Oberon-class
diesel-electric submarines were purchased and commissioned between 1964 and 1968.
These now twenty year-old boats are the whole of Canada's present submarine force.
Still, they filled a much needed primary ASW and secondary anti-surface role. The diesel
boat is an extraordinarily quiet platform which is difficult to detect by acoustic methods
while on station (on batteries), moving very little, and utilizing its passive sonar to
monitor the movement of others. However, its operational parameters allow only sixty
day patrol without additional logistical support. The diesel submarine is a vessel of
position and requires a lot of time to transit from one zone of operations to another.
Another limitation is its inability to maintain submerged high speed for long periods of
time. Even more debilitating, the diesel submarine must surface or come to "snorkeling"
depth with relative frequency in order to breathe air into its generators which recharge
the battery.
As an option the potential use of mines specifically in the Arctic was given
consideration. Because these waters are ice-covered most of the year, the only vessel
capable of laying such mines is a nuclear-powered submarine. Two factors were
paramount to this issue. The first was the desired kill probability which was placed at
90%. The second is where would the mines actually be placed. Three choke points in
the north were identified as suitable for mining. With a 90% kill probability, it was
calculated that 95.000 mines were required to cover those areas. The cost of these mines
would be S5 billion Canadian just to put them down one time. In addition, there is no
vessel capable of going into mine fields under the ice and taking a large mine field out
of action as would be required by the 1907 Hague Convention. A final consideration is
that once a mine field is in place, and once the field has been armed, it is indiscriminate
as to whom it attacks. [Ref. 9: pp. 46-48]
In order to have capabilities match commitments in the peacetime and wartime
missions of the Canadian Navy, the Canadian government has chosen to acquire
nuclear-powered submarines Today nuclear propulsion technology is both mature and
affordable. According to testimony heard before the Standing Committee on National
defense in Canada's House of Commons, nuclear powered submarines are 1.7 time more
expensive than their diesel counterparts but the SSN outperforms the diesel by a factor
of three [Ref. 9: p. 44]. The SSN is capable of very high sustained speeds and can
establish patrol operations in the furthest flung corners of the world's oceans with
minimal delay. This speed and the ability to cover distance has tremendous impact on
operational capability and utility. Other assets include stealth, invisibility, and
survivability; it is not oxygen dependent and rarely if ever needs to surface thus
drastically reducing chances of detection. The length of any SSN's patrol is limited only
by the amount of food the crew has carried onboard. Because, according to the White
Paper. Canada intends to meet her responsibilities in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the
Arctic and to conduct regular, operational patrols in all three, the SSX becomes the only
viable option. Only the nuclear-powered submarine is capable of sustained operations
under the ice.
At present two boats are under consideration as Canada begins to fulfill the
intentions of the White Paper. One is the Rubis-Amethyste- class SSN built by the
French government's Direction des Constructions Navales. The other is the
Trafalgar-class produced by the private enterprise Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering
Ltd. of Great Britian. The criteria for selecting the French or the British boat will be
costs, capabilities, and the willingness of the foreign companies to participate with
Canadian firms. [Ref. 10: p. B5] It is estimated that S7.5-8 Billion Canadian in
1986-87 dollars will be the money necessary to acquire from ten to twelve submarines
and to put in place the infrastructure which will support them. That infrastructure would
include training facilities and nuclear facilities as well as changes to existing naval bases
at Halifax and Esquimalt necessary to accommodate the new boats. This amount is
calculated based on 65% Canadian production over the life of the program
[Ref. 9: p. 2-4], It is intended that the first Canadian boat would be built in the
country of origin with Canadian engineers and technicians on hand to watch and learn
[Ref. 10: p. B5]. Roughly this breaks down to about S500 million per boat and S2-3
billion for the infrastructure. Table 2 compares some of the features of the Trafalgar
and the Rubis-Amthyste. Regardless of which boat is chosen, certain modifications
would have to be made in order to meet Canadian requirements.
The leading contender is the British Trafalgar which is considered superior to the
smaller and less expensive French Rubis-Amethyste in terms of quietness and weapons
capability [Ref. 11: p. 104]. The Trafalgar faces some obstacles that the
Rubis-Amethyste does not. however. Under a 1958 agreement, the United States and
Great Britain must agree together before either transfers nuclear technology to a third
party. American approval is necessary because the Trafalgar's propulsion is based on
U.S. innovations and technology. Under a 1959 U.S.-Canadian agreement. Congress has
a veto over the transfer of U.S. technology with military applications to Canada. A
major stumbling block was lifted when the U.S. defense and energy departments signed
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an agreement on 27 October 1987 to allow Britain to supply Canada with this technical
information [Ref. 12: p. 1]. This may have been the result of high level diplomatic
maneuvers but the effort could pay ofT when the Canadian government announces its
decision in June 19SS. Another plus point for the Trafalgar is that it is compatible with
the Mk. 48 torpedo. Not only is the Mk. 48 NATO interoperable but the Canadians
have already purchased 4S of the U.S.-made torpedo. U.S. permission would be required
to modify the Rubis-Amethyste for compatibility with the Mk. 48 but this could be done
[Ref. 13: p. 88].
Table 2. RUBIS-AMETHYSTE AND TRAFALGAR SUBMARINES
Rubis-Amethyste Trafalgar
Displacement:
Surfaced 2385 tons 4200 tons





Machinery: 2 turbo alternators; 2 geared
1 electric motor steam turbines
Reactor: 1 pressurized 1 pressurized
water cooled water cooled
Speed: 25 knots 32 knots
Armament: 4\21 in (533mm) 5x21 in (533)
tubes tubes
Complement: 66 officers & men 97 officers & men
[Ref. 14]
D. REACTION FROM THE UNITED STATES
The United States certainly has the technology and the production base to support
the Canadian SSN program. Then why isn't there any American contender for this
obviously lucrative contract? Money is at least part of the answer. A fully equipped
U.S. Navy Los Angeles-class submarine now costs about S700 million. S200 million
11
more than what Canada intends to pay for each boat. Even lowering the costs by
tailoring a Los Angeles hull to Canadian requirements might not make enough
difference [Ref. 15: p. 22]. At one time it seemed possible that there would in fact be
a late American entry into the competition. General Dynamics considered offering an
updated Tullibee or Sturgeon class but the proposal never materialized. Another
possible answer is that American corporations were as much surprised by the Canadian
plan as the naval attache at the U.S. Embassy in Canada, believed the Pentagon was and
simply did not have time to put together a credible proposal [Ref. 12: p. 35]. Given
that taking advantage of emerging opportunities is something that the American
business community is very, very good at, this reason for non-participation is not a
strong one. A final potential explanation and perhaps the one most correct is that the
absence of the American business community is a manifestation of Washington's
reported disapproval of certain aspects of Canada's White Paper and associated security
or defense policy.
Canada has chosen to give greater weight to her own national requirements and to
steer a more independent course of action rather than completely subordinate herself to
NATO. No one can fault this. What can be criticized is the negative effect this will have
on some of her closest allies. Norway in particular will be hurt. Canada's reasons for
abandoning her commitment to reinforce Norway in times of crisis may be completely
valid. This is not what concerns the United States but rather the U.S. questions why
more of the proposed 2% defense spending growth is not targeted for improvement in
her conventional forces. The deficiencies which led Canada to her decision could be
overcome but it would admittedly be expensive. No matter how sound Canada's
rationale may be for this "shift" in commitment, the signal it sends to the Soviet Union
is a matter of extremely grave concern not only to Norway but to the United States as
well. The real dichotomy of Canada's plans to abandon her commitment to reinforce
Norway as an economy measure is the intention, at the same time, to spend SS billion
on a new submarine fleet. It is reasonable to assume .therefore, that the need for such
a fleet was so powerfull, so overwhelming that it completely overshadowed Canada's
other responsibilities. "During the summer of 1987, Canada's Minister of External
Affairs Joe Clark declared publicly that the proposed new submarines would defeat all
challenges to Canada's Arctic sovereignty and that the major challenge today came from
the United States" [Ref 4: p. 10]. Characterizing your closest neighbor and most
powerful ally as a threat of any sort is hardly conducive to the type of warm, cooperative
12
relationship with that neighbor. An informal survey of press reports in both Canada and
the US show an overwhelming amount of the public rhetoric concerning Canada's new
SSX program focused on the sovereignty claims and the American "threat" to those
claims. Is it any wonder the United States has responded with substantially less than
enthusiastic support for Canada's proposed SSX fleet? It is most unfortunate that the
well supported security arguments which support and, in many respects, justify Canada's
decision to acquire SSNs have not been given more public attention.
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III. A QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
Reporter
There is more political will in Canada today to go to our North and make our
presence felt. There is a feeling we should know what is happening on our borders.
Pentagon
What you're saying is you (Canada) want to do what's already being done. We (the
US) already watch the Arctic and we're your best friends and allies. Excuse me for
being blunt, but what is the real motivation? Ego?
Reporter
Partly--but isn't that what nationhood is all about? [Ref. 16: p. 19]
Even before the 1987 White Paper hit the streets, leaks of its contents to the press
were filled with the proposed SSN fleet and the contribution such a fleet would make in
enforcing Canada's sovereignty in the North. In reality the subject of sovereignty was
addressed in only about five hundred words and there is no mention of SSNs within that
section. The word "sovereignty" is used only three other times and always in association
with "security". It isn't too difficult to figure out that this "sovereignty" is an important,
emotionally ladened issue for the Canadian public, press, and government officials.
Between even the closest neighbors and the best of friends there can be strong
differences of opinion which can, if not handled well, threaten to poison the relationship.
For the United States and Canada, an issue which matches this description is the
question of sovereignty over a group of waterways which link the Atlantic Ocean and
the Arctic collectively known as the Northwest Passage. Canada considers the
Northwest Passage to be under its exclusive control. Canada claims the right to
determine how, when, and under what conditions a vessel can travel through this
gateway between the Arctic Ocean and the Atlantic. The United States does not agree.
The US argues that the Northwest Passage is an international strait through which
vessels of any nation can move unannounced and unrestricted. Neither Canada nor the
US is likely to have a change of heart on this matter. For the United States, freedom
of the seas is a cherished tradition with direct ties to national security and economic
health. Although her own national security concerns in the Arctic are real enough, for
Canada, the question of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage is even more directly
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related to national pride. It is important to remember this relationship to national pride
when looking at the legal question of territorial waters vs high seas.
Sovereignty is the right and power to govern. Canada believes her claims of
complete sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Archipelago which includes the
Northwest Passage to be supported by historic title and the doctrine of straight
baselines:
A. BASELINES, TERRITORIAL SEAS, AND INTERNAL WATERS
The territorial sea is the belt of ocean adjacent to the land territory and the internal
waters of a coastal state. Under international law, territorial seas extend seaward from
"baselines". The fixing of these baselines is important because it determines how far
seaward a coastal state may claim its territorial seas. The normal baseline for measuring
the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast. Under normal conditions, this
would allow the baselines to follow the curvature of the coast. Internal waters extend
landward from baselines; territorial seas extend seaward from baselines. Internal, or
national, waters include rivers, most bays, some gulfs, lakes, and ports; territorial seas
are seaward of these internal waters. Sovereignty extends to the air space above and the
seabed and subsoil beneath these waters. But the extent of this sovereignty is different
in internal waters and territorial seas. A state exercises complete sovereignty over its
internal waters in the same way as over its land territory. The sovereignty over the
territorial seas is subject to the right of innocent passage.
There are special cases where a nation may draw "straight" baselines as opposed to
the "normal" baselines. Under international law, a state with fringing islands or a deeply
indented coastline may draw straight baselines according to specific criteria. An oceanic
archipelago may also draw straight baselines.
Until the present century, most coastal states traditionally adopted a three-mile limit
defining the breadth of their territorial seas. In the seventeenth century, the content,
purpose, and breadth of territorial seas had become clearly defined. A cannon shot
carried about three miles and "the control from the land ends where the power of man's
weapons ends" [Ref. 18: p. 72]. The three mile limit may have originated from the fact
that, at sea level, line of sight from the shoreline is about three miles rather than the
range of cannon shot. However, the tradition developed, the result was a three-mile
limit to territorial seas which was practical and acceptable. During the last twenty years,
however, this has changed. Following a trend of many countries developing since the
early part of the century, in 1970, the Canadian government extended Canada's
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Figure 1. The Baseline (from which the territorial sea is measured) [Ref. 17: p. 37]
territorial sea breadth to twelve nautical miles (nm). Today customary- international law-
permits a coastal state to establish a territorial sea of up to twelve nm in breadth. This
extension of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles would place many important
international straits, which formally had high seas areas running through them, within
the territorial sea of the coastal state. Included in this category is the Northwest
Passage. The United States has not extended her territorial seas to twelve miles but has
continued the three-mile limit adopted in 1793.
After passage of the 1970 law extending Canada's territorial sea to twelve miles, the
government issued a statement which carefully omitted any distinction between
territorial and internal waters saying "the effect of the new limit on the Northwest
Passage was that, under any sensible view of the law, it is subject to complete Canadian
sovereignty" [Ref. 16: p. 52]. Three years later the Canadian justice department became
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very specific and declared that Canada claimed the waters of the Canadian Archipelago
to be internal waters although this claim was not backed up by any treaty or legislation.
Such a claim, however, is not presently recognized under international law.
B. INNOCENT PASSAGE AND TRANSIT PASSAGE
1. The Right of Innocent Passage
The Northwest Passage is considered to have as many as seven routes through
the Canadian Archipelgo which provide ways to move between the Arctic and the
Atlantic Oceans. With a twelve mile territorial sea each of routes contain at least one
area of territorial sea. This has the effect of limiting the rights of non-Canadian vessels
to the right of innocent passage through the Northwest Passage unless the Northwest
Passage is considered a strait used for international navigation.
Not merely a privilege but a right, innocent passage is accepted in international
law and was codified by the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone. This convention concluded that no "toll charge" could be assessed, innocent
passage was to be unhampered, and dangers to navigation should be appropriately
identified. It stated that "passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State" [Ref. 19: p. 5]. Such passage does not
include stopping or anchoring unless this is made necessary by some form of distress.
The 1958 Convention also held that it was not the character of the ship, but
rather the character of the passage itself that was the determining factor. This means
that commercial vessels and warships have the right of innocent passage through a strait
as long as that passage is not a threat to the security of the costal state.
A coastal state has the power "to take necessary steps in its territorial sea to
prevent passage which is not innocent". A coastal state has the right to temporarily
suspended the innocent passage of foreign ships in the territorial sea if that is considered
to be essential to the protection of its national security. Also, a coastal state has the
right to expel a warship that refuses to comply with local regulations. [Ref. 19: p. 6]
It is the right of innocent passage which distinguishes the legal status of
territorial seas from that of internal waters where a state's sovereignty is complete. The
basic principles of this portion of the law of the sea are set down in the 1958 Convention
and can be summarized as follows:
1. Innocent passage is a right, and not merely a privilege to be granted or refused at





Figure 2. Routes 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Northwest Passage [Ref. 16: p. 42)
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Figure 3. Routes 5, 6, and 7 of the Northwest Passage [Ref. 16: p. 45]
2. The innocence of the passage is generally determined by reference to the nature of
the passage itself but, in the case of ships carrying polluting materials, it may be
determined by its conformity with certain anti-pollution standards.
3. The right of innocent passage applies to both merchant ships and warships,
although its application to the latter has been disputed by some. The passage of
merchant ships may be suspended temporarily for security reasons, and warships
may be expelled for refusal to comply with regulation of the coastal states.
Submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag.
A. The right of innocent passage exists in the following areas.
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a. Internal waters newly-enclosed by straight baselines, if the newly-enclosed area
was formerly territorial sea.
b. Territorial waters, either along the coast or in a strait.
c. Straits connecting two parts of the high seas or one part of the high seas and
one part of territorial waters. If such straits are used for international
navigation, there can be no suspension of the right of innocent passage.
[Ref 19: p. 19]
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention defined innocent passage this way.
Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State [Ref. 20: Art. 19].
Passage of a foreign ship is not innocent if the ship engages in any of the twelve activities
specified by the 1982 Convention. These activities include:
1
.
any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind
2. any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense of security
of the coastal State
3. any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to international law.
The right of innocent passage applies not only to territorial seas and to
newly-enclosed internal waters, it also applied to straits connecting two parts of the high
seas, whether or not they are formed entirely of territorial waters. One determining
consideration is the fact that a strait connects two parts of the high seas. A second
important consideration is the fact that a strait is used for international navigation.
These principles have been upheld in the International Court in the Corfu Channel Case
[Ref. 19: p. 15-16]. These two points—that a strait connect two parts of the high seas
and is used for international navigation-contributed to the conclusion that such passage
should not be incorporated into the regime of innocent passage but should be considered
separately.
2. Transit Passage
In addition to innocent passage, international law also today recognizes a new
regime of passage through some straits used in international navigation that consist
entirely of territorial sea. Transit passage is the exercise of freedom of navigation and
overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of a strait between
two areas of the high seas or between two exclusive economic zones [Ref. 20: Art. 3SJ.
The establishment of this new regime governing transit passage resulted from
the demands of major maritime nations, the United States among them, which were not
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willing to accept the extension of the width of the territorial sea out to twelve nautical
miles without a guarantee of unobstructed passage through the more than one hundred
straits affected by that extension. There are two major differences between innocent
passage and transit passage. In transit passage, as opposed to innocent passage, aircraft
may overfly straits and submarines are permitted to navigate submerged
[Ref. 17: p. 107].
It is the position of the United States that the Northwest Passage is a strait
used for international navigation to which the regime of transit passage applies.
Canada, on the other hand, considers the Northwest Passage to be internal waters
subject to her complete sovereignty and neither the right of innocent passage nor transit
passage apply.
C. CANADA'S LEGAL POSITION
Canada's claim to sovereignty in the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and
the Northwest Passage rests on two premises. One is that Canada has acquired
sovereignty through the right to enclose internal waters within straight baselines and the
other that sovereignty stems from historic title.
1. Straight Baselines for Coastal Archipelagos
Coastal archipelagos are defined as "those situated so close to a mainland that
they may be reasonably considered part and parcel thereof, forming more or less and
outer coastline from which it is natural to measure the marginal seas" [Ref. 19: p. 69].
Normally, baselines coincide with the low-water mark, and follow the curvature of the
coast. There are. as already indicated, exceptions to this rule. International law as set
out both in the 1958 Convention and the 19S2 Law of the Sea Convention allows
straight baselines "in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity" [Ref. 17: p. 51].
The 1958 Convention codifying customary international law provides seven criteria in
the drawing of straight baselines.
1. Straight baselines may be used to join a fringe of islands along and in the
immediate vicinity of the coast.
2. Straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
direction of the coast.
3. The sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land
domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.
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4. Baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or
similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on
them.
5. The economic interests of a region may be considered in drawing particular
baselines, providing such interests are clearly evidenced by long usage.
6. There is no maximum length for straight baselines except for bays. For bays, the
closing line cannot be more than 24 miles long.
7. The waters enclosed by straight baselines are considered as internal waters, but the
right of innocent passage continues to exist in water areas formerly considered as
part of the territorial or of the high seas. [Ref. 19: pp. 79-80]
An oceanic archipelagic state may also use straight baselines, within certain
limits to join the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago [Ref. 20: Art. 47]. An archipelagic state is a state whose territory consists
entirely of one or more archipelagoes; it may include other islands, but may not possess
any continental mainland [Ref. 20 : Art. 40]. International law permits the use of straight
baselines to enclose oceanic archipelago
,
but not archipelagoes adjacent to continental
states. Nevertheless, in 19S6, Canada's House of Commons made a declaration of
straight baselines encompassing the Canadian Archipelago. This was the first concrete
legislation to declare the waters inside the baselines to be internal. As internal waters,
Canada claims complete sovereignty—without the right of innocent or transit passage.
Canada's archipelago is neither an oceanic archipelago nor is it "a fringe of islands" and,
therefore, lacks the legal basis under either of these regimes to be enclosed in straight
baselines.
The US does not accept the use of straight baselines to delineate territorial
waters except in very few areas that comply with international law such as Yugoslavia,
Norway, and southern Chile [Ref. 19: p. 85].
2. Historic Title
Some commentators argue that Canada's sovereignty over its Arctic
archipelagic waters has historic basis and that she has an established, historic title to
these waters. Donat Pharad, a professor at the University of Ottawa and a respected
authority on this issue, provided the following definition of historic bays which he
believes could be applied to historic waters in general.
The term 'historic bays' means those bays over which coastal State or States have
effectively exercised sovereign rights continuously for a period of long standing, with
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Figure 4. Formal Boundries Claimed by Canada [Rcf. 16: p. 51]
While not based on established international law, there are three generally recognized
requirements which must be met. The first is the exercise of authority by the coastal
state, the second is that this must occur over a long period of time, and the third is the
acquiescence by foreign states in this authority. It would appear that in the case of
Canada's Arctic water none of these criteria can be met.
Following World War II, US ice breakers, sometimes with Canadian observers
onboard, probed Canada's Arctic straits, sounds, and channels while carrying supplies
to remote US-Canadian weather stations. The first ship to navigate iMcClure Strait was
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USCGC Westwind in 1948. The USS Edisto and the Westmnd were the first ships since
Sir Edward Belcher's journey in 1852-54 to probe the Penny Strait. Later, the Edisto
became the first ship to transit the Fury and Hecla Strait and circumnavigate Baffin
Island. [Ref. 21: p. 67]
Since 1903, there have been about fifty known complete transits of the
Northwest Passage. Table 3 on page 25 provides a list of these transits as compiled by
the Canadian Coast Guard. Of these, over half were conducted by Canadian ships with
the remainder foreign. One-quarter of the total number of transits were made by US
ships. Two of these ships gained notoriety with the Canadian public-the Manhattan and
the Polar Sea.
In 1969, the Manhattan which was owned by Humble Oil (now Exxon)
demonstrated that icebreaking bulk carriers specifically designed for such service can
operate year round between Alaska and the East Coast or between Japan and the North
Sea [Ref. 21: p. 70]. Many in Canada saw the transit as a threat to Canadian Arctic
sovereignty and were angry that the US had not sought permission from the Canadian
government. What was not brought out in the press reports nor was it mentioned in
some more recent writings [Ref. 16] is the fact that oil company representatives (it was
not a mission of the US government) and the US Coast Guard consulted closely with
Canadian officials. They sought advice and requested that a Canadian ice breaker
accompany the Manhattan. Canada gave the voyage full approval and support. Captain
T. C. Pullen. RCN, was onboard the Manhattan as a representative of the Canadian
government. In his opinion, the Manhattan's master "was meticulous in matters of
protocol, and ilew the Canadian Hag as appropriate" [Ref 21: p. 71].
If looked at closely, the way in which Manhattan's transit of the Northwest
Passage was handled by Humble Oil. actually supported Canada's sovereignty claim:
permission to transit the Northwest Passage was requested and obtained. Still, this
greatly angered the press and at least a portion of the Canadian public and was seen as
a threat to Canada's sovereignty.
Sixteen years later, in 1985, USCGC Polar Sea transited from the Atlantic to the
Pacific through the Northwest Passage. This was not a deliberate attack on Canadian
sovereignty but rather, at least in US eyes, a sensible operational deployment-trie Polar
Sea is a powerful icebreaker and the chosen route was the shortest available by far. In
US eyes this is an international waterway open to transit by all. The Canadian
government was informed of the plan but permission was not requested.
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Table 3. LIST OF FULL TRANSITS OF NORTHWEST PASSAGE
Year Ship Flag
1903-6 Gjoa Norway
1940-2 Si Roch Canada
1944 St Roch Canada
1954 CCOS Labrador Canada
1957 USCG Storis US
USCG Bramble US
1958 USS Xautilus us
1960 USS Seadragon us
1962 USS Skate us
1967 CCGS John MacDonald Canada
1969 Manhattan US
CCGS John MacDonald Canada
USCG Northwind US
USCG Staten Island US





CCGS John MacDonald Canada
1976 CCGS J.E. Bernier Canada
Canmar Explorer Canada
1976-S J.E. Bernier II Canada
1977 Willilaw Holland
197S CCGS Pierre Radisson Canada
CCGS John MacDonald Canada
CCGS Louis St Laurent Canada
MV Canmar Kigoriak Canada
1980 CCGS J.E. Bernier Canada
Pandora II Canada
19S1 CSS Hudson Canada
Mermaid Japan
Morgan Stanley Canada
1983 Arctic Shiko Canada
Polar Circle Canada
1984 Linbad Explorer Sweden
1985 USCG Polar Sea US
Arctic Helios Canada
Arctic Mallik Canada
CCGS John Mac Donald Canada
World Discoverer US
1986 Kalvik Canada
[Ref. 16: pp. 227-228]
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Since the USS Xautilus became the first submarine to reach the North Pole in
195S. there has been quite a bit of submarine traffic in the Arctic. Table 4 provides a
list of announced Arctic submarines operations. It is not unreasonable to speculate
there have been many others which were not announced. In 19S7. two US SSNs were
joined by a British Trafalgar for joint exercises in the Arctic. When the surfacing of a
US submarine at the North Pole is made public or a joint Western submarine exercise
in the Arctic is announced, the United States does not specify how the SSNs reached the
North Pole other than to say that they traveled through international waters.
Table 4. ANNOUNCED ARCTIC SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
Date Submarine North Pole
August 1958 Xautilus Yes
August 1958 Skate Yes
March 1959 Skate Yes
February 1960 Sargo Yes
August I960 Seadragon Yes
June 1962 Leninskiy Komsomolets{So\iei) Yes
July-August 1962 Skate & Seadragon Yes
Februarv 1967 Queenfish No
March-April 1969 Skate No
April 1969 Whale &. Pargo Yes
July-August 1970 Queenfish Yes
November- Skate &.Hammerhcad Yes
December 1970
February 1971 Skate No
Februarv- Trepang No
March 1971
March 1971 Dreadnought (British) Yes
March-April 1973 Seadragon & Hawkbill No
March-Mav 1975 Bluefish Yes
April-May 1976 Gurnard Yes
September- Sovereign^niish) Yes
October 1976
March-April 1977 Flying Fish Yes
October 1978 Pintado Yes
April-Mav 1979 Archerfish Yes
October 1981 Sihersides Yes
December 19S2- Fautog & Aspro Yes
Januarv 1983
August 1983 L. Mendel Rivers No
[Ref. 22: p. 122]
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The waters of the Northwest Passage are ice-covered for much of the year.
Canada does not possess, at present, the powerful icebreakers or the nuclear-powered
submarines necessary to enforce her claims of sovereignty or to exercise authority over
the Northwest Passage. Other maritime nations, including the United States and the
Soviet Union, have the capability to transit this passage at will and do not consent to
Canada's authority over these waters. In fact, both the United States and the Soviet
Union hold that the Northwest Passage is an international waterway. Neither accept the
claim that it be regarded as among Canada's internal waters.
D. STILL A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION
Canada's claim of complete sovereignty over the Northwest Passage is difficult to
support. Her claim that this waterway is and always has been part of Canadian internal
waters where even right of innocent passage does not exist is dubious and apparently
without support under international law. The 19S2 Law of the Sea Convention (which
for unrelated reasons the US did not sign) is not in force. It did, however, codify
customary international law permitting a coastal state to extend its territorial seas from
three to twelve nautical miles. For Canada and the maritime nations interested in
transiting the Northwest Passage the extension brought parts of the Northwest Passage
under the definition of territorial sea. This does not strengthen Canada's claim of
sovereignty or even restrict foreign ships to innocent passage, because of the new right
of transit passage. International law does not support Canada's enclosure of her
archipelago with straight baselines nor can her claim of sovereignty find any real support
through historic title.
The United States continues to insist that the Northwest Passage is an international
waterway. Captain T. C. Pullen, RCN, put it very well.
But contrary to what some Canadians believe, the Northwest Passage is the sea
route that links the Atlantic and the Pacific north of America. It does not originate
in the east where Lancaster Sound meets Baffin Bay and terminate in Amundsen
Gulf in the west; if it did, the passage would be exclusively Canadian. In fact, it is
an ice-encumbered route stretching 2,850 nautical miles from Greenland's Cape
Farewell to Bering Strait in Alaska. It has an international dimension. Mariners
attempting to navigate the Northwest Passage must sail 1.200 nautical miles in the
Canadian Arctic, but they also travel through-750 nautical miles of Alaskan waters,
plus 900 nautical miles of waters in which Canada shares an interest with Denmark
and Greenland. [Ref. 21: p. 70]
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The strategic interests of the United States will not allow her to accept any agreements
which would close off important waterways. Such compromises would set a dangerous
precedent for the other choke points around the world which must be kept open and for
the future US security role in the Arctic.
E. US-CANADIAN AGREEMENT JANUARY 1988
On 11 January 198S, in Ottawa, an agreement on Arctic cooperation was signed by
the governments of Canada and the United States [Ref. 23]. The two most important
points of this agreement which can be found in Appendix 2 are:
1. The Government of the United States pledges that all navigation by US icebreakers
within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent
of the Government of Canada.
2. Nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavor between Arctic neighbors and
friends nor any practice there under affects the respective positions of the
Governments of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or
other maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties.
A third equally important part of this agreement is what is not said-submarines are not
mentioned. Basically the United States and Canada have agreed to disagree. Both have
bowed however slightly to the wishes and needs of the other. The US by promising to
request permission for her icebreakers (surface ships) to enter waters claimed by Canada
to be internal and Canada by not mentioning transits by US SSNs. If both governments
will accept this document for exactly what it says, no more and no less, it could help
soothe battered egos and security concerns on both sides of the border.
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IV. CANADA'S THREE OCEANS AND THE SOVIET THREAT
So here we are—a great nation of continental dimension—required--by geography,
history, economics, and security—to recognize our maritime status and against that




As you are aware, two of the Soviet navy's assessed five basic missions are strategic
offense, which involves the use of submarine-launched ballistic and sea-launched
land attack cruise missiles and the protection of those launch vehicles or submarines,
and secondly, the interdiction of sea lines of communication. [Ref. 9: p. 7]
Rear Admiral John Anderson
Chief. Submarine Acquisition Program
2 February 19SS
Following years of neglect, the Canadian navy is preparing to meet the challenges
of today and the foreseeable future. Canada is the world's second largest nation and has
the world's longest coastline, some 250,000 km of it. If you include the waters of the
Arctic archipelago add 6.3 million km of shoreline. Canada must be able to protect not
only her economic interests but to meet her security requirements in the three oceans
which border her shores-the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Arctic. Each ocean is
important in terms of Canadian defense and the defense of Canada's allies. The
maritime forces on the East Coast consist of two destroyer squadrons each with six
destroyers, a submarine squadron and seven maritime air squadrons. The destroyers,
with embarked helicopters, operate in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) task groups which
conduct surveillance operations, protect vital shipping and support other NATO
maritime commitments. On Canada's west coast are two destroyer squadrons each with
four destroyers, only two maritime air squadrons, and no submarines at all. These units
conduct surveillance operations and support joint Canadian-US security operations.
Canadian naval planners are proceeding with a plan for three task groups, one based in
the Pacific and the others on the East Coast. The primary mission of these task
groups-tactical ASW [Ref. 25: p. 87].
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A. THE ARCTIC'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
It is not possible to discuss Canada's intentions to acquire SSNs without a great deal
of attention being focused on the Arctic Ocean. Leaving the sovereignty issue aside for
the moment, there are very good reasons of national security which would drive the same
decision. On one level it is all too easy to ignore the Arctic if for no other reason that
the fact that it appears as an uneven, white band at the top of most maps. Seen from
a different perspective, the top of the world is obviously an area of strategic importance
which cannot be ignored. The shortest routes between the population and industrial
centers of the United States and the Soviet Union run over the Arctic. For Canada, lying
between the two super powers, an increase in her involvement in the defense of North
America within the Arctic waters is a wise move.
1. The Arctic Mediterranean
For the sake of a working definition, "the Arctic" is composed of the Arctic
basin, which includes the Arctic Ocean and the "circumpolar seas"--the Barents, Kara,
Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi Seas; its littoral, comprising northern Alaska and
Canada, all of Greenland, northern Norway and the Svalbard archipelago, and the
northern shores of the Soviet Union with its associated islands; and its approaches-the
Bering Strait, the Greenland and Norwegian Seas, and Iceland [Ref. 26: p. 1]. While
this definition may appear too generous to some, the Soviet Ministry of Defense extends
the boundaries of the Arctic TVD (theater of military operations) even farther. The
Arctic TVD includes not only the central Arctic Basin but also the Norwegian and
Greenland Seas, Baffin Bay, and even Hudson Bay [Ref. 27: p. 4],
The Arctic Ocean occupies about 14 million square kilometers, a portion of
which is topped by a permanent polar ice-cap. The thickness of this ice varies from one
to twenty meters but some ice islands may be 60 meters thick. Of critical importance to
missile-firing submarines are the polynyas (a Russian name) or area of open water which
account for 5-8% of the ocean surface in winter and as much as 15% in the summer.
There are few permanent features of this ice mass but the annual limits of old and new
ice are known. The ice conditions for any particular time or place are not possible to
predict although there are some recurring polynyas in parts of the Canadian Arcipelago
and off the west coast of Greenland. The entire mass of sea-ice is constantly in motion
drifting clockwise and making a complete circuit every two to four years. The water
beneath this moving ice can be as deep as 5000 meters. The deepest waters are on the
North American side where the continental shelf is narrowest. On the Soviet side the
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Figure 5. A View From the North Pole [Ref. 16: p. 10)
continental shelf is very wide, as much as 1500 kilometers wide, forming the relatively
shallow circumpolar seas.
The Arctic is shared roughly equally between the Soviet Union and five other
nations-Norway, Iceland, Greenland (a part of the kingdom of Denmark), the United
States, and Canada. All five of these nations are members of NATO. Four-Norway,
Greenland the US, and Canada-share the shores of this mediterranean while the fifth,
Iceland, guards the major outlet of the Arctic to the Atlantic. The only other exits are
through the narrow Bering Strait between the Soviet Union and the US, or through the
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Canadian Archipelago. These waterways are of critical importance if moving from the
Arctic Ocean into the North Atlantic or if moving from the Pacific to the Atlantic.
Advances in technology have raised both the military and the economic utility
of the Arctic. Once a massive, impenetrable barrier, the Arctic has become the site of
growing competion between the Soviet Union and the West. The Arctic is now seen as
an area of potentially immense wealth, holding perhaps as much as 50% of the world's
oil reserves plus natural gas, coal, and strategic minerals. In the military arena, two
weapons platforms developed since the close of World War II have opened this formerly
closed environment. One is the long-range strategic bomber capable of utilizing the air
ways over the pole and the other is the nuclear-powered submarine capable of utilizing
the waterways under the pole.
2. The Soviet Threat
On the Kola Peninsula some 300 kilometers inside the Arctic Circle is the
homeport of the Soviet Union's powerful Northern Fleet. This location was chosen not
because it is within the 67 degrees north latitude but for its comparatively unrestricted
access to the open sea. The Kola Peninsula enjoys continuous access to the Atlantic
and. as the western end of the Northern Sea Route, it has seasonal access to the Pacific
Ocean as well. Even so. in order to gain the waters of the Atlantic, the Soviets must first
travel through the relatively shallow waters off Norway and the potential barrier of the
GIUK gap. The Soviets have unrestricted access to only one deep water area-the Arctic
Ocean. It is here at Severomorsk and Polyarny, north of Murmansk, that the other half
of the Soviet's general purpose submarine fleet and some 60% of the Soviet ballistic
missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) fleet are homeported. A major wartime priority for
the Soviets will most certainly be protecting those SSBNs and the guaranteed second
strike; however, a secondary mission for Soviet SSNs will almost as certainly be
interdiction of NATO SLOCs and the flow of supplies from North America to Europe.
The Soviets view the Arctic TVD as an enclosed theater. It is possible to enter
or to leave this theater only through a small number of relatively narrow passages.
Controlling these choke points will play a central part of any Soviet effort to gain
control of the Arctic. These choke points are natural defensive positions and the key to
the ability of the Soviet submarine force to exploit the Arctic TVD's central location in
the Northern Hemisphere. Soviet military theorists have said that "control of straits and
strait zones enables naval forces to maneuver rapidly between theaters, and to interdict
the movement of (enemy) ships to other areas of a sea or ocean TVD." World War II
32
is filled with examples illustrating the validity of this statement. In the future, the role
of choke points in maritime strategy will grow in importance.
Since warfare of the future. . .may take on a global scope, various types of naval
forces will need to maneuver between ocean theaters of military action. The role
of straits such as the Bering Strait, the Drake Passage, the straits of the Canadian
Archipelago, and others-which have almost never before been utilized in maritime
warfare-will then be considerably enhanced.
Through the Canadian Archipelago four narrow passages control all inter-theater
movements:
1. the Robeson Channel (18 NM wide)
2. the Lancaster Sound (38 NM wide)
3. the Fun* and Hecla Strait (7 NM wide)
4. the Cardigan Strait (6 NM wide)
The Robeson Channel and Lancaster Sound are between 200 and 500 meters deep while
the Fury and Hecla Strait and the Cardigan Strait are less than 200. The need to control
choke points such as these is as important to NATO and the West as it is to the Soviet
Union. [Ref. 27: pp. 7-9]
The importance of the Arctic as a defensive bastion for Soviet strategic (SSBN)
submarines is widely accepted. Soviet SSBNs now deploy into the Barents Sea and the
Arctic Ocean on a routine basis. Today, longer-range missiles would enable those
submarines to reach targets throughout most of continental North America without
having to leave the heavily guarded waters near the Soviet Union. It is believed that in
the event of hostilities, the Soviets will keep the majority of their naval assets in these
heavily defended homewaters. This would provide not only a defense in depth for the
SSBNs and their guaranteed second strike but also provide a front line defense against
possible invasion of the Soviet homeland. The result of this "bastion" notion may be
that NATO must venture into Soviet dominated waters in order to challenge these naval
assets which contribute to Soviet ablility to continue war-fighting. Challenging this
war-fighting capability is made even more difficult once those strategic submarines slip
beneath the Arctic ice giving the Soviets a formidable hidden nuclear reserve. Once
beneath that protecting ice shield, the SSBNs could transit over the pole to the deeper
waters off the North American continent. These submarines are relatively safe from the
anti-submarine warfare efforts by surface or airborne assets, instead, the only ASW
platform which can threaten them is an SSN.
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It may well be that Soviet SSBNs will never leave their bastions and under the
cover of ice approach the North American continent through the Canadian Archipelago.
It's enough to realize that they could do so. The case for cruise missile shooters is
somewhat different. The Soviets have the weapons platforms, the weapons, and the
capability to utilize good firing positions in the Arctic—including the Canadian
Archipelago- this is sufficient to warrant real concern. Not only are coastal targets of
the North American homelands at risk but as the result of technological advances
affecting range and accuracy plus simply being able to get closer, other military and
industrial potential targets are also put at risk.
In addition to being within range of the target, a firing submarine must have
enough open water to launch. It is believed that the Soviets would require water that
is less than 50% covered by ice. According to Commander Peter T. Haydon, Canadian
Forces, there are only two realistic firing positions for a short range cruise missile and
three for the longer range weapons:
Amundsen Gulf
Gulf of Boothia
Davis Strait and Labrador Sea
approaches to Hudson Bay
Hudson Strait
Of these five locations, only one, the Davis Strait and Labrador Sea, is useful year
round. Appendix 1 provides a list of the nine areas considered and a map identifying
each. From a launch point in these areas, there is no shortage of secondary strike targets
in the more heavily populated parts of Canada and the north-eastern US for the longer
range SLCMs. [Ref. 27: p. 16]
The threat from Soviet launched cruise missiles against targets in the north is
only one of the implications of Soviet control of the Arctic TVD for offensive
employment of the Soviet Navy's general purpose submarines. Another which is of
concern is the employment of those submarines in adjacent oceans-lhe Atlantic and the
Pacific. As the map in Figure [Ref. 2: p. 57] shows, the Arctic can be used be Soviet
submarines to enter both the North Pacific and the North Atlantic where they would
threaten NATO convoys as well as commerce in the Asia-Pacific region.
3. ASVV Operations in the Arctic
As already indicated, there are several uses for the waters of the Arctic by hostile
submarines. One is to transit into the Pacific or the Atlantic. Another would be to
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Figure 6. Possible Soviet Submarine Routes [Ref. 2: p. 57]
launch cruise missiles. And a third reason for Soviet SSNs (or Canadian or American
SSNs) to be in the Arctic is to conduct surveillance or ASW-anti-submarine warefare.
The ice would be too great a threat to the thin-hulled ASW frigates and
destroyers; even if an ice-breaker were fitted with ASW equipment, the ice would still
damage sonar domes and towed sensors (variable depth sonar and towed arrays).
Aircraft cannot drop sensors or depth charges.through the ice. Submarines can go under
the ice but conventional submarines can do so only for periods of time too short to be
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terribly useful. One simple conclusion is unavoidable, the only platform capable of
operating in the ice-covered Arctic is a nuclear powered submarine.
Although hydrographic surveys of the Arctic are far from complete, there are
only a limited number of channels through which submarines can move into or out of
the Arctic. Within the Canadian Archipelago only three are believed to have sufficient
water depth:
1. The Northwest Passage, from Lancaster Sound through Barrow and McClure
Straits
2. Smith Sound to Nares Strait
3. Jones Sound through Cardigan Strait and the channels through the Sverdrup
Islands. [Ref. 28: p. 14]
There are also several large bodies of water deep enough for submarines to operate
safely. When transiting under the ice, active echo sounders are necessary to give
warning of ice keels and uncharted sea mounts (pingos). Other than the aid of these
navigational sonar systems, the submarines must rely on the use of Very Low Frequency
(VLF) signals, which can be received under the ice, satellite navigation fixes, and
"landmarks" prepositioned on the sea bed [Ref. 26: p. 4]. Taking into consideration the
channels deep enough to accommodate submarines transiting the Arctic and areas which
provide good firing positions for cruise missiles, the most likely locations for patrol areas
are easily identified.
In the Arctic, Canada intends to enhance its ASW effort by using fixed acoustic
sensors. Although such sensors have certain limitations they are essential to maintaining
realistic ASW surveillance and defense. The proposed fixed sensors will provide advance
warning of intrusions and the proposed SSNs are necessary to localize, identify, and to
intercept the intruding submarines.
The anti-submarine war in the Arctic will require the combined capabilities of
air, surface, and subsurface platforms. Passive, fixed sensors working with sensors, both
active and passive, onboard ships, planes, and submarines will be needed to localize and
identify contacts. In open ocean such contacts can be intercepted and prosecuted by
any of the weapons platforms. Under the ice is another story and in ice-covered Arctic
waters only a nuclear powered submarine can perform the tasks of intercepting and
prosecuting hostile submarines.
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PACIFIC OCEAN ATLANTIC OCEAN
Figure 7. Maritime Command Areas of Responsibility [Ref. 25 : p. 87].
B. INCREASING EMPHASIS ON THE PACIFIC
The Pacific, the largest geostrategic area in the world, is becoming increasingly
important to Canada. Ottawa has not had a consciousness as a Pacific nation; however,
the 1987 defense policy White Paper recognizing as it does the strategic importance
of events in the Pacific to Canada marks a major step along the path of
acclimatizing Canadian policy-making to the demands and rigours of serious
participation in the Pacific Rim security community [Ref. 29: p. 2].
In 19S2, for the first time, Canadian trade with the countries of Asia and the Pacific
surpassed her trans-Atlantic trade. In June. 1984, the Secretary of State for External
Affairs stated that during the past twenty years two way trade with the Asia-Pacific
region has multiplied six times and Canadian exports have increased faster to that region
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than to any other area of the globe. Japan has been Canada's second largest trading
partner (after the US) since 1973. The Strait of Juan de Fuca which gives access to
Vancouver. Seattle and Puget Sound, is one of the world's busiest waterways. In 1985,
the port of Vancouver handled over 51 million tons of cargo. This is more that the
combined total of Halifax, Toronto, Montreal, and Quebec. [Ref. 25: pp. 79-80]
The security of this impressive amount of economic interchange is by no means
assured. Canada has a military responsibility for Juan de Fuca in cooperation with the
US and for an area of the North Pacific that runs from the 49th parallel to the 165th
meridian. This great ocean area is roughly bounded by a line halfway to the Aleutians
and the 49th parallel, including the Gulf of Alaska as well as Canada's own west coast.
Under the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan (CANUS). defense of her eastern
Pacific interests is shared between Canada's Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAC) and
the US Third Fleet. In wartime their responsibility would include defense of
reinforcement, resupply and shipping to Alaska and the western Pacific as well as
exports to Western Europe from Vancouver via the Panama Canal. Canada's SSNs
would surely contribute to a credible defense of the sea lines of communication (SLOC)
between Asia and Canada and Asia and the US. With SSNs homeported on her west
coast, Canada would have the options of participating in operations in the Arctic or
transiting through the Northwest Passage to assist in the Atlantic in support of NATO
as well as conducting missions in the Pacific.
In all of Canada's three ocean areas of the Pacific, the Atlantic, and the Arctic, the
primary threat to her territory and approaches comes from Soviet military capabilities,
specifically the Soviet maritime capabilities. The build-up of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in
the past ten years from a predominately coastal defense force to a powerful "blue-water"
navy, the largest and most powerful of the four Soviet fleets, has raised well founded
concern. Canada is and will continue to be sheltered under the umbrella of US nuclear
deterrence having no desire to acquire strategic nuclear weapons of her own. With this
in mind, the approaches to the Trident submarine base at Bangor. Washington, requires
conscientious protection. Some consider this base to be second only to the Soviet bases
on the Kola Peninsula in strategic importance.
The Trident base at Bangor has attracted the interest of Soviet intelligence in the
form of routine patrols by Soviet intelligence collectors with in the Strait of Juan de
Fuca. Patrolling Soviet submarines are also believed to probe this focal area. The




Figure 8. Strait of Juan de Fuca [Ref. 30: p. 149]
leave acoustic detection devices on the bottom of the strait in order to localize or mark
Trident submarines as they transit to and from home port. Others believe the Soviets
may wish to tap into and monitor undersea cable communicaton between North
American and Australia. These cables may carry data from early warning satellites
down-linked to facilities in Australia [Ref. 29: p. 13].
Current vulnerability will be reduced by the stationing of the NIMITZ carrier battle
group in Everett WA on Puget Sound planned for 1989. Until then, the NIMITZ will
operate out of Bremerton further south. Even with the arrival of the NIMITZ, which
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should be seen as an American response to the growing Soviet submarine threat to
North America's west coast. Canadian capabilities to counter the growing threat must
also increase unless one is willing allow American naval forces to patrol Canadian waters
because MARPAC lacks the ASW assets to exercise effective sea control in the Strait
of Juan de Fuca. Up to now Canada has committed no dedicated resources to undersea
surveillance in this area aside from a few ASW aircraft based at Comox on Vancouver
Island. The transfer of a destroyer from the Atlantic to the Pacific fleet gives Canada
exactly one destroyer in the Pacific which is capable of working with naval helicopters.
Aside from monitoring the comings and goings of American SSBXs and maybe
listening in on potentially sensitive communication, the Soviet threat is also a more
direct one in the form of the submarine launched cruise missile (SLCM ). Cruise missiles
have been in existence for a long time. The Soviets have been developing and deploying
various types of cruise missiles since the late 1950s. However, advances in weapons
technology have made cruise missiles, nuclear and non-nuclear, a matter of increasing
concern. Ten years ago cruise missiles were relatively short-range and considered an
anti-surface, anti-shipping weapon. Today, the longer-range SLCMs and the air
launched variety (ALCM) can be targeted for objectives on land. While it is assumed
the main mission of the SLCM will be as a second strike weapon, there may be a tactical
role as well. Very recently, the long-range SS-X-21 SLCM became operational.
The SS-X-21 is believed to be the counterpart of the US Tomahawk. It has a range
of 3000 km (1600 NM) and can be launched from most modern Soviet SSXs from a
standard 533 mm topedo tube. It may be carried on the new Soviet Mike class attack
submarine and the new Sierra class SSX as well as existing Victor III and Akula SSXs.
It is believed that today the Soviet Union has only about two dozen of these missiles.
According to recent estimates, though, by 1995, the Soviets could deploy as many as
1500. Also of interest and concern is the SS-XX-24 a large SLCM that has been linked
with modified Yankee SSBXs. It is reported to have a range of 1600 km and is expected
to be operational in the next few years. According to Vice-Admiral Thomas,
Commander Maritime Command, "it is necessary to credit every Soviet submarine with
being a cruise missile firer. . .they have converted the first of the Yankeee class, which
was de-missiled as a result of the missile treaties, and have now equipped it with cruise
missiles and sent it back to sea because they are not covered by the treaties"
[Ref. 9: p. 25].
40
SLCMs have a terrain matching flight profile which make them immune from
detection by existing ground based radar except at the time of launch. For this reason,
each missile would have to be treated as an individual, low flying target. SLCMs are
fairly slow, flying at less than Mach 1. At that speed and if fired near their extreme
operational range, the SS-N-21 would take two to three hours to reach its target.
Multiple launches would be needed in order to saturate North American defense systems
and achieve a satisfactory kill probability.
The increasing ability of Soviet submarines to quietly approach the North American
coastline at bases, airfields, ports, and command and control sites both reduces the time
of flight and warning time and brings more strategic targets and industrial centers within
range. Even NORAD headquarters in Colorado are at risk. This makes the task of
detecting, localizing, and, if necessary, prosecuting the launch platform, the submarine,
enormously important. Canada's need to increase her anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capabilities is pretty obvious. Canada must maintain unrestricted access to the seas and.
with the US, protect shipping and the sea lines of communications within the Pacific.
Nuclear powered submarines will be a valuable asset not only for ASW missions but, in
more general terms, will also contribute to deterrence, defense of the Canadian
homeland, and alliance commitments.
C. NATO AND THE ATLANTIC
Since World War II, Canada has placed the highest priority upon NATO and her
Atlantic fleet. While it does not rule out fighting in other theaters, the White Paper has
made it emphatically clear that Canada's security continues to be intimately involved
with the security of Western Europe and NATO. For this reason, Canada's commitment
to and focus on the Atlantic will continue to be paramount. In other than peacetime,
Canada would by NATO agreement, place her submarines under the operational
command of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). SACLANT's ASW
escort forces is of direct concern to the Commander Maritime Command (MARCOM)
in Halifax who, as COMCANLANT, is a Principle Subordinate Commander (PSC) to
SACLANT. COMCANLANT is responsible for the Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area to
CINCWESTLANT. Since 1979, a Canadian Rear-Admiral has served as Deputy Chief
of Staff to SACLANT. In 1986, a Canadian Commodore position as Chief of Staff to
CINCWESTLANT was established and manned. Canadian participation at these high
levels with the joint commands is ample evidence of Canada's determination to support
NATO's maritime strategy. In peace time, NATO's maritime strategy calls for visible
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and credible deterrent forces capable of maintaining an effective level of surveillance.
This would enable NATO to monitor changes of build-ups in Soviet naval deployment
patterns and demonstrate the ability to exercise sea control over vital sea lines of
communication (SLOC).
In times of crisis and should a conventional war extend even a month, NATO and
Western Europe would be entirely dependent on those SLOCs for resupply. It is
estimated that in war NATO would require 1800 trans-Atlantic convoys in the first
month alone-most passing through Canada's NATO zone [Ref. 16: p. 157]. The
ability to control the geographic water space through which the convoys to Europe must
pass and to deny the use of that same water space to the adversary is the main
responsibility of Canadian maritime forces in support of NATO and adds credibility to
the flexible response strategy outlined in the US maritime strategy. For NATO to fight
beyond its inplace munition, these SLOCs. particularly in the North Atlantic, must
remain open--free from Soviet interdiction. Defense of convoys is a traditional role for
Canada and not just in the continental approaches to Canada but for the entire
trans-Atlantic passage. Traditionally, this was the mission of frigates which must stay
in fairly close to that convoy they are shepherding. The acquisition of SSN's by the
Canadian navy does not mean that the frigates will be out of a job or no longer
necessary. Instead, the combined efforts of the surface and sub-surface assets will mean
that the Canadian navy can provide better, more effective defense of those convoys
which will be vital to NATO's survival and eventual success. It is not surface units
which pose the greatest threat to such convoys but rather is a sub-surface one-Soviet
submarines.
According to Adm. Crickard, the greatest need in the western Atlantic is for ASW
escorts [Ref. 32: p. 15]. In this role, the SSNs can be well employed. The US
maritime strategy calls for aggressive, advance operations which would carry the fight
into our adversary's backyard rather than allow him to chose the time and place of
confrontation. Canada has as little enthusiasm as the US for a maritime battle waged
off North America's east or west coast. Even the ability to conduct operations in Soviet
homewaters alone without any declaratory policy to back it up is an important political
statement.
Soviet submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula are homeport to about half of the
Soviet's general purpose submarine force. (The Soviets have about 300 general purpose
submarines compared with the US which has roughly 100.) In order to enter the SLOCs
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Figure 9. Canada's NATO Naval Zone [Ref. 16: p. 156]
of the North Atlantic so vital to NATO, Soviet submarines must pass through the
potential barrier of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap before gaining
the waters of the Atlantic. The GIUK gap is "guarded" by the Sound Surveillance
System (SOSUS), a system of fixed, passive sensors which is reasonably successful at
detecting and monitoring submarine transits. Canada pariicipates in this system under
Canada-United States Basic Security Plan and has access to the intelligence data
provided by SOSUS. (Canada does not contribute to the Pacific SOSUS systems and





Figure 10. The GIUK Gap [Ref. 31: p. 9]
conventional submarines are assigned to "barrier" operations to protect the
trans-Atlantic sea routes and the proposed SSNs would fullfill a similar role. Intelligence
provided to the patrolling SSNs through SOSUS and other sources contribute to the
successful prosecution of hostile submarines. The objective is to seek out the Soviet
weapons platform a thousand miles from its intended launch point , long before the
submarine can fire its missiles at the convoy or strategic target. As it is true for the
Pacific, the best way to meet Canadian needs and responsibilities in the Atlantic is the
nuclear powered submarine.
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V. CANADIAN SSNS--GOOD FOR CANADA-GOOD FOR CANADA'S
ALLIES
A. A CHANGE IN CANADA'S MARITIME FORCES: THE ADDITION OF SSNS
Through the public forum of the 1987 White Paper, the government of Canada has
announced its intentions to make major changes to Canada's military and to her defense
posture. Among other things, the White Paper publicizes the planned acquisition often
to twelve nuclear powered submarines. These submarines will, the government hopes,
help assert Canada's claim of sovereignty in the waters of the Canadian Archipelago
including the Northwest Passage. The SSNs will also have a clearly martial role in
support of national security in the face of potential Soviet aggression. According to the
White Paper. Canada intends to protect her interests in the Pacific, the Atlantic, and the
Arctic. If the plans outlined in the White Paper are fully implemented, Canada and her
closest ally and neighbor, the United States, must establish an effective working
relationship in the three oceans in which they share security interests. This need is above
and beyond the final answer to the sovereignty question.
1. The 1987 White Paper
The 1987 White Paper outlines some basic changes to Canada's military and the
deployment of her forces. Canada intends to show a real increase in her defense
expenditures. This is welcome news because Canada holds a dismal record in that
respect. News which is not so welcome, is Canada's decision to abandon her
commitment to reinforce Norway in times of crises. This is a matter of grave concern
not only to Norway herself but also to the United States and NATO as a whole.
Canada's troop commitment will shift to the central front as soon as another NATO ally
can assume Canada's former commitments in Norway. One feature of the White Paper
has received more attention than any other. That feature is Canada's decision to
build buy SSNs. The projected cost of this program is S8 billion (Canadian) over a
fifteen to twenty year period. The submarine will be purchased from either the French
or the British. The choice should be made in the near future. Canada has stated her
intention to use those submarines in support of her claims to sovereignty in her coastal
archipelago and in support of her security needs in all three oceans which form a large
percentage of her borders. The decision was made in favor of nuclear powered
submarines because of their far superior speed and maneuverability over the capabilities
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of a diesel submarine. It is not a coincidence that a nuclear powered submarine is the
only vessel which can operate under ice.
2. A Question of Sovereignty
Canada and the United States are in complete opposition on the matter of
sovereignty in the Northwest Passage. It is not possible for either to ever fully accept the
other's position on this issue. For Canada it is a matter of national pride and part of
her romantic view of "the North." The United States has a more pragmatic orientation
as a maritime nation unwilling to accept restrictions on her freedom of navigation in
international waters. It is doubtful that either side would be willing to take this issue to
the World Court because neither side can afford to lose. International law appears to
favor the position of the United States that the Northwest Passage is a strait used for
international navigation and subject to the right of transit passage. No matter how
convincing these legal arguments may be. they are not likely to change Canada's stance
on this issue. Canada claims sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Archipelago
including the Northwest Passage through the use of straight baselines to enclose her
coastal archipelago as internal waters without even the right of innocent passage and
through historic title. Neither oi^ these are presently supported in customary
international law.
3. Canada's Three Oceans and the Soviet Threat
Canada has three oceans on her shores and has economic interests and national
security responsibilities in all of them. The Arctic Ocean is an area of increasing
strategic importance for both the East and the West. The ice-covered waters provide a
haven for Soviet SSBNs in their own homewaters. The Soviet SSNs freely patrol the
Arctic and hold an additional threat for Canada and the US in the form of SLCMs.
These weapons, while still a dangerous anti-surface, anti-shipping weapon, now can be
be targeted for objectives on land in support of tactical objectives. A major concern is
the possible employment of the Soviet SSNs in waters adjacent to the Arctic--in the
Atlantic and in the Pacific.
Canada continues to hold that her security is intimately bound to that ofNATO
and western Europe and for that reason the Canadian Atlantic fleet is given first priority.
Traditionally, Canada has provided escorts for convoys carrying supplies essential to the
resupply and survival of NATO. These convoys are primarily at risk from hostile
submarines. For NATO to fight beyond its inplace munition, the Atlantic SLOCs must
remain free of Soviet interdiction.
46
Canada has not really thought of herself as a Pacific nation in the past. Today,
however, with the dramatic increase in two-way trade between Canada and the nations
of the Pacific Rim. Canada finds herself more interested in and more involved in the
security of this geostrategic area. Both the US and the Soviet Union have increased their
presence in this area which is of great economic and strategic significance. Maintaining
open sea lines of communication in the Pacific is of great importance to Canada and her
neighbor, the United States. As in the case of the Atlantic, the greatest threat to the
SLOCs so important to Canada and her allies are Soviet submarines.
The best anti-submarine weapon is another submarine. In all three ocean areas
in which Canada has a vested interest, the primary threat to the security of Canada and
her allies arises from Soviet submarines. If Canada wishes to more completely fulfill her
own security needs and lessen whatever dependence she has on her allies in this, the
decision to acquire SSXs is a big step in that direction. For Canada's allies, this
strengthening of Canada's military capabilities is most welcome.
B. ALTERNATE FUTURES
Science fiction writers and futurologists have long been fascinated with the
possibility of alternate futures—ones arising from choices made at critical points in
history. What if the choice had been this instead of that, how would the present be
different? For each choice or decision made, there is an alternate future resulting from
a different choice. In a way, the United States needs to look at the alternate futures of
Canada's decision to acquire SSXs.
Canada is a democracy and. like other democracies, the government must be elected
by the people in order to hold power. This is an election year in Canada and the current
government must be re-elected in order to remain in power and continue it's plans and
policies. The present administration strongly advocates an increase in defense spending.
a general up-grade of the military as a whole, and a greatly improved naval capability.
Canada intends to acquire SSXS or at least the government headed by Prime Minister
Mulroney intends to acquire SSXs. If he is victorious in the next election, he will have
the chance to carry out the plans identified in the 1987 White Paper. This includes the
decision to acquire SSXs. The opposition parties in Canada feel very differently about
the proposed SSX fleet. Some see it as an aggressive, warlike move which does not
reflect Canada's peaceful motives. For some Canadians, nuclear power is the same thing
as nuclear weapons and they want no part of it. Others would simply rather see the
money spent on child care programs. If either the Liberal Party or the XDP coalition
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government gains power in the next election, it is entirely possible the decision to acquire
SSNs would be reversed. This would effectively remove the possibility of a US
submarine bumping into a Canadian one conducting a sovereignty patrol. The problem
would be solved before it even began.
Before any victory celebration takes place, is this really in the best interest of the
United States? At a time when defense expenditures are facing a freeze and the US can
no longer single-handedly defend the free world, the US is actively encouraging her allies
to assume a greater share of their own defense burden. Japan is an excellent example
of an ally the US is encouraging to increase its defense budget. In spite of the fact that
the US may feel the money would be better spent on improvements to Canada's
conventional forces, the Canadians are at least willing to make a greater contribution to
the defense of North America-on their own terms.
The decision has been made. Continued US opposition to Canada's plans will
certainly cause more harm than good. Such opposition would certainly strengthen the
hand of those who argue against close Canadian relations with the US. It is not smart
to deliberately contribute to anti-American sentiment. Canada is doing exactly what the
US has encouraged her to do--she just isn't doing it exactly the way the US would like
for her to.
The United States should actively encourage this proposed Canadian fleet and assist
in any way that Canada would like for her to. This would allow Canada to benefit from
the US experience and technical expertise; it would allow the US to assist in putting into
place a safe system for nuclear-powered submarines. The safety record of the US in this
regard is without equal. Active support of this close ally would contribute to the
compatibility of the two SSN fleets.
Canada's need for SSNs is just as real as the United States' need although those
needs differ slightly. No one can argue that the two neighbors do not share common
security and defense requirements in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Arctic Oceans.
Canada's SSNs can, in fact, actively complement the United States' operations in these
three oceans. But. in order for this to happen, the United States and Canada must work
together.
On the sovereignty issue there will be no meeting of the minds. Canada claims
complete sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Archipelago including the
Northwest Passage with no right of innocent passage much less transit passage. She
makes these claims based on the use of straight baselines to enclose internal waters and
48
on historic title. Canada has a very large emotional investment in this matter and will
not concede her claim. The United States is a maritime nation with global interests and
cannot allow restrictions to be placed on its mobility. The US regards the Northwest
Passage as a strait used for international navigation and subject to the right of transit
passage. The position of the US on the subject is as inflexible as Canada's. What must
be done then is to learn to work around these opposing viewpoints. As already
discussed, an agreement on Arctic cooperation was signed between Canada and the US
in January. This agreement does not even pretend to solve the dispute. Instead, it offers
a way for both parties to feel as if they have won a victory without an unacceptable loss.
It offers a "legal" basis for cooperation and joint operations without changing the
position of either Canada or the US with regard to the Northwest Passage.
Such joint operations will require a formal working relationship. The United States
and Canada have been very successful in establishing such relationships. The North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has proven to be an effective way
to maximize the air defense of North America. There is no reason why a similar type
of organization could not be utilized. At the same time, establishing a new command
of this type would be expensive and may not be necessary. There are organizations
already inplace which could fill this role. An example of this is the Canadian American
Permanent Joint Board of Defense. On the east coast, these two NATO members are
under the command of SAC LANT. Redefining or expanding the role of such
organizations may be all that is needed.
Canada and the United States have a formidable partnership in insuring the safety
and security of North America. Canada's decision to acquire SSNs and participate more
fully in the defense of her homeland should be welcomed. The emphasis on the
utilization of the proposed SSNs to enhance Canada's sovereignty claims in the
Northwest Passage could be a crucial part of gathering public support for increased
defense spending. If two such close neighbors and allies are unable to resolve their
differences, then the ability of either to successfully conduct foreign affairs is in question.
The United States should welcome the strengthening of Canada's military capability and
offer whatever assistance is desired as Canada implements the proposal to acquire SSNs.
For her part, Canada should seek a way to actively complement and enhance the
security operations the United States already has in place.
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Figure 11. Possible Cruise Missile Launch Sites [Ref. 28: Annex B]
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APPENDIX B. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON ARCTIC
COOPERATION
1. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada
recognize the particular interests and responsibilities of their two countries as
neighboring states in the Arctic.
2. The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States also recognize
that it is desirable to cooperate in order to advance their shared interests in Arctic
development and security. They affirm that navigation and resource development in the
Arctic must not adversely affect the unique environment of the region and the well-being
of its inhabitants.
3. In recognition of the close and friendly relations between their two countries, the
uniqueness of ice-covered maritime areas, the opportunity to increase their knowledge
of the marine environment of the Arctic through research conducted during icebreaker
voyages, and their shared interest in safe, effective ice breaker navigation off their Arctic
coasts:
• The Government o^ the United States and the Government of Canada undertake
to facilitate navigation by their icebreakers in their respective Arctic waters and to
develop cooperative procedures for this purpose;
• The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States agree to take
advantage of their icebreaker navigation to develop and share research information,
in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law, in order to
advance their understanding of the marine environment of the area;
• The Government of the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S.
icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertakes with
the consent of the Government of Canada.
4. Nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavor between Arctic neighbors and
friends nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments
of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas
or their respective positions regarding third parties.
5. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. It may be terminated at any
time by three months' written notice given by one Government to the other.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have signed
this Agreement.
DONE in duplicate, at Ottawa, this 11th day of January, 1988, in the English and
French languages, each version being equally authentic.
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